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The Ninth Circuit-Most Maligned Circuit
in the Country-Fact or Fiction?
HON. JEROME FARRIS*
The Honorable Jerome Farris argues that the reason the Supreme Court
overturns such a high percentage of Ninth Circuit cases accepted for review is
not because the Circuit is "too liberal. " Rather, Judge Farris emphasizes the
high volume of cases heard by the Ninth Circuit and its willingness to take on
controversial issues. He suggests that any objective observer would conclude
that the Ninth Circuit is functioning well and that the system is working
precisely as the Framers of the United States Constitution intended.
The shell game has survived over the centuries because there are always
those who are not merely willing, but delighted, to be deceived. If the game is
played often enough and mindlessly enough, one can come very close to
fooling "all of the people all of the time."
The Ninth Circuit-most maligned circuit in the country-fact or fiction? It
is absolutely true that the United States Supreme Court accepted twenty-nine
cases from the Ninth Circuit for review in 1997 and reversed twenty-eight of
those decisions, affirming only one. The prior year, the Supreme Court
reviewed twelve Ninth Circuit cases and reversed ten. In 1995, the Supreme
Court reviewed fourteen Ninth Circuit decisions and reversed ten. During that
period, no other circuit had so many decisions reversed or so high a percentage
of reversals of cases accepted for review. 1
According to these statistics, the Supreme Court reversed ninety-six percent
of the Ninth Circuit cases it reviewed in 1997, an all time high.2
In the year ending March 31, 1997, the Ninth Circuit decided 8701
matters. In the same period ending in 1996, the Ninth Circuit decided 7813
matters. In 1995, the Ninth Circuit decided 7955 matters. If one considers the
number of Ninth Circuit decisions reversed by the Supreme Court against the
total number of cases decided by the Ninth Circuit, an entirely different picture
emerges. Under this analysis, the Supreme Court let stand as final 99.7 percent
of the Ninth Circuit's 1996 cases. No circuit in history has decided so many
cases, and no circuit in history has had so low a percentage of cases reversed.
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1 The Supreme Court decided a total of ninety-one cases in the 1996 term, reversing
sixty-five, affirming twenty-three, and otherwise disposing of three. See Thomas C.
Goldstein, Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term 1996, 66 U.S.L.W. 3068 (U.S.
July 15, 1997).
2 All other circuits outside of the Ninth Circuit suffered a combined reversal rate of
sixty-one percent. See Bill Kusliak, Reversal Rate Keeps Getting Uglier, San Francisco
Recorder, July 2, 1997, at 1.
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The point is not that one statistic is right and that the other statistic is
wrong, but that statistics can be deceiving and can be used to paint almost any
picture one wants. Courts issue "opinions"; they do not decide right and wrong
in an absolute sense. Courts cannot determine right and wrong in an absolute
sense because the law is not absolute. Deciding a legal rule is not like figuring
out an immutable law of physics-a court always strives for "the right answer,"
but because the law has a life of its own, time determines what is correct.
Courts on occasion reverse themselves for just that reason.
Any Ninth Circuit judge worthy of the title would want to revisit the
decisions that were taken for review to determine whether in any single instance
Supreme Court precedent was ignored. One cannot expect newspaper reporters
to make that kind of review. News articles report the facts and others analyze
the facts. It is my view that no responsible "expert" would comment before
making such a review. What the review would reveal is no mystery because all
decisions are in the domain of the public.
In 1997, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed twenty-one cases (eight
of those decisions were per curiam). In the one Ninth Circuit case that the
Supreme Court affirmed (the vote was eight to one), the majority held that the
opinion properly followed Supreme Court precedent. 3 In one case that the
Supreme Court unanimously reversed, the Ninth Circuit followed a Tenth
Circuit decision. The Eighth Circuit, however, decided the issue a different
way and the Supreme Court resolved the split.4
In Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.,5 a six to three reversal,
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, noted in dissent that "an impressive
line of lower court decisions applying both federal and state law"'6 has, like the
Ninth Circuit, precluded liability in analogous situations.7
3 See Babbitt v. Youpee, 117 S. Ct. 727, 732 (1997). In Babbitt, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding that a provision of the Indian Land Consolidation Act
worked an unconstitutional taking by requiring escheat to the tribe of certain fractional
interests in allotment upon the owner's death. See id.
4 See California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingbam Constr., 117 S. Ct.
832 (1997). The Ninth Circuit held that a California prevailing wage law governing wages of
apprentices was preempted by ERISA. See Dillingham Constr. v. County of Sonoma, 57
F.3d 712, 722 (9th Cir. 1995). In reversing, the Supreme Court found that the law at issue
neither referred to nor was connected with ERISA. See Dillingham Constr., 117 S. Ct. at
834. Thus, the Court held that the law did not "relate to" an ERISA plan for purposes of
preemption. See id.
5 117 S. Ct. 1783 (1997).
6 Saratoga Fishing, 117 S. Ct. at 1791.
7 The Ninth Circuit decision employed the East River doctrine, see East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986), to preclude liability for
property damage sustained on a vessel. See Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle, Inc., 69
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In eight of the reversed Ninth Circuit cases, the Supreme Court resolved
conflicts between the circuits: Old Chief v. United States;8 California Division
of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction;9 United States v.
Brockamp;10 Regents of the University of California v. Doe; 1 Inter-Modal Rail
Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway;12 United States v.
Hyde;13 Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot;14 Quality King Distributors, Inc.
F.3d 1432, 1446 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit found that equipment added to a vessel
after purchase was part of the "product itself." See id. In reversing, the Supreme Court
concluded that the after-acquired equipment constituted "other property," and was not a part
of the "product itself." See Saratoga Fishing, 117 S. Ct. at 1784.
8 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997). In United States v. Old Chief, the Ninth Circuit found that,
despite a defendant's offer to stipulate, the government was entitled to present evidence of a
prior felony to prove the current charge of felon in possession of a firearm. See No. 94-
30277, 1995 WL 325745 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 1995) (basing the decision on 18 U.S.C. § 922
(g)(1)). The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the rejection of a defendant's offer to
stipulate to a felony conviction constituted an abuse of discretion where the name or nature of
the underlying conviction raised the risk of tainting the jury's verdict. See Old Chief, 117 S.
Ct. at 645.
9 117 S. Ct. 832 (1997). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10 117 S. Ct. 849 (1997). In Brockamp, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
holding which allowed equitable tolling of the statutory limitations period for tax refund
claims. The Supreme Court concluded that the strong language of the statute precluded the
Ninth Circuit's application of the presumption favoring equitable tolling. See id. at 851.
11 117 S. Ct. 900 (1997). In Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 65 F.3d
771, 776 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit held that the University of California's right to
indemnification from the federal government divested the university of Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a state entity's potential legal liability,
rather than financial responsibility for judgments, triggered the application of the Eleventh
Amendment. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 117 S. Ct. at 904.
12 117 S. Ct. 1513 (1997). In this action, the Supreme Court held that an ERISA
provision prohibiting interference with protected rights applied to welfare plans. See id. at
1515. The Ninth Circuit found that the provision applied only to interference with the
attainment of rights capable of vesting. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison,
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 80 F.3d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1996).
13 117 S. Ct. 1630 (1997). In Hyde, a criminal defendant attempted to withdraw his
guilty plea after the plea was accepted, but prior to acceptance of the plea agreement. The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's refusal to allow withdrawal without a showing by
defendant of a "fair and just reason." See Hyde v. United States, 92 F.3d 779, 781 (9th Cir.
1996). The Supreme Court held that a showing of "fair and just reason" by defendant was
necessary. See Hyde, 117 S. Ct. at 1631.
14 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997). In Glicknan, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
determination that mandatory assessments on growers, handlers, and processors of California
tree fruits to pay for generic advertising violated the First Amendment. See id. at 2142. The
Supreme Court rejected the use of a heightened First Amendment scrutiny and the Ninth
146719971
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v. L'anza Research International, Inc.1 5 Thus, in many of the cases that were
reversed, the Ninth Circuit was not alone in concluding a different result than
the result the Supreme Court reached. Make no mistake, however, the Supreme
Court did criticize the Ninth Circuit in some of its reversals. In one reversal,
the Supreme Court stated that the Ninth Circuit failed to follow Supreme Court
precedent. 16
Courts are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent. However, what we
write are opinions. The sin is not being wrong, but being wrong when the
guidance was clear and when there was a deliberate failure to follow the
guidance.
Two cases illustrate the dilemma of circuit courts: Washington v.
Glucksberg,17 regarding physician-assisted suicide, and Printz v. United
States,1 s regarding the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.19 The
Supreme Court reversed both of these Ninth Circuit decisions.
The Brady Act was widely discussed publicly and received much political
interest. At issue in Printz v. United States was whether the Brady Handgun Act
violated Article I, § 8 and the Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution by commanding chief law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks of handgun purchasers. In a two to one decision, the Ninth
Circuit found no constitutional violation. The Supreme Court, by a vote of five
to four, reversed. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined; O'Connor filed a
concurring opinion; Thomas fied a concurring opinion; Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined; Souter filed
a separate dissenting opinion; and Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Stevens joined. One might reasonably conclude that the solution was less than
obvious.
Physician-assisted suicide has also been soundly debated in both public and
political arenas. The question for decision in Glucksberg was whether a
Washifigton statute that imposes a criminal penalty on anyone who "aids
another person to attempt suicide" denies the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause liberty interest of mentally competent, terminally ill adults to
choose their time and manner of death. The Ninth Circuit, in an eight to three
en banc panel decision, found a liberty interest in the right to die and then
Circuit's finding that the law compelled financial support of others' speech. See id. at 2138-
39.
15 117 S. Ct. 2406 (1997) (mem.).
16 See Suitun v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (1997).
17 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
18 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
19 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
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weighed the individual's compelling liberty interest against the state's interest.
The Ninth Circuit found the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit decision with five separate concurring
opinions.
Was the Ninth Circuit "wrong" in either of these cases? The Circuit would
have been, in my opinion, if it had not resolved each of the complex issues and
given them full, careful, and decisive consideration. The Supreme Court
reversed these decisions, but who would say that the system is not functioning
as it was intended to function? Everyone is entitled to their own views, but the
conclusion, in my view, is that the system envisioned by the Framers of the
Constitution continues to function properly.
The decisions of the Supreme Court become the law of the land because
our system of government requires settled law. It is therefore necessary that one
court make a final decision, and, right or wrong, that decision governs our
society.
That the Supreme Court can be "wrong" is evident to any student of
American law, history, politics, or society. This country's jurisprudential
history is filled with famous cases, affecting our entire society, in which the
Supreme Court decided that it had previously reached an erroneous result:
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka;20 Bunting v. Oregon;2' Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority;22 and twice reversing itself on death
penalty cases in the 1970s, to name a few.
The Supreme Court also reverses itself in many less well-known cases.
This term it reversed a decision regarding public school teachers in parochial
schools. 23 The term before that it reversed itself in Seminole Tribe ofFlorida v.
Florida,24 and the year before that in Hubbard v. United States.25 Justice
Brandeis's dissent in the 1932 case, Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 26
argued that the Supreme Court should overrule an earlier decision 27 and cites
20 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
21 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (overruling Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
22 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976)).
23 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402 (1985), and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)
(overruled as to the portion addressing the "Shared Time" Program).
24 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989)).
25 514 U.S. 695 (1995) (overruling United States v. Branblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955)).
26 285 U.S. 393 (1932), overruled by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S.
376(1938).
27 See Gillespie v. Okla., 257 U.S. 501 (1922), overruled by Helvering, 303 U.S.
at 376.
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thirty-five cases in which the Supreme Court overruled or qualified its earlier
decisions.
This list of Supreme Court reversals-in no way meant to be
comprehensive-actually constitutes a high reversal rate considering that the
Supreme Court currently averages about eighty to ninety decisions a year, or
one percent of the number of cases that the Ninth Circuit hears. This
comparison suggests that the Supreme Court would have to reverse one
hundred Ninth Circuit cases a year in order to reverse the Ninth Circuit at as
high a rate as the Supreme Court reverses itself (which it does about once a
year).
In other instances, Congress has decided that the Supreme Court had the
wrong answer and enacted legislation to effectively overrule the decision, such
as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)28 and the 1982
Voting Rights Act Amendments.29 The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the 1982 Voting Rights Act Amendments30 and it found
RFRA unconstitutional. 31
Do these results prove that Congress was right and that the Supreme Court
was wrong? Or do these results prove that the Supreme Court was right and
that Congress was wrong? Of course not. Rather, the results provide examples
of the checks and balances designed in the Constitution to make our
government run properly. Similarly, when the Supreme Court reverses an
appellate court decision, it does not mean that the decision was wrong in an
absolute sense, and more importantly, it does not mean that the appellate court
was not functioning properly in its role in the judiciary and in the United States
government.
Part of the cause of the misperception about right and wrong is created in
the training of lawyers at law school. Most law schools begin teaching law in a
formalistic manner: the student learns the law, and there is only one correct
law. This formalism gets carried on as law students enter the legal profession.
Lawyers often argue before me that there is only one possible result ("The law
dictates this result!"). This is rarely true, and is never true in complicated cases.
There are always some arguments for each side, otherwise the case would be
frivolous. The bottom line is that reasonable minds can differ and can each still
be reasonable.
The Ninth Circuit deals with more cases than any other circuit. It is not
surprising, then, that the Ninth Circuit would deal with more complicated and
important issues than any other circuit. Both of these factors contribute to the
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
29 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994).
30 See Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 117 S. Ct. 1491 (1997).
31 See Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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Supreme Court's review and reversal of more Ninth Circuit cases than cases
from other circuits.
Some observers contend that the Ninth Circuit is reversed so often because
it is the most liberal circuit in the country and because the Supreme Court is
currently conservative. This hypothesis also provides ammunition to those now
arguing that the Ninth Circuit should be split (a topic for another article).32
However, these observers have failed to review the facts. Of the opinions
signed by Ninth Circuit judges that were reversed this year by the Supreme
Court, eleven were authored by Democratic presidential appointees, and nine
were authored by Republican presidential appointees. Apparently the Supreme
Court is an equal opportunity reverser.
To function properly, each court must do its duty to the best of its ability.
Parties must be able to rely on the full resolution of cutting edge issues in each
court to which the issues are submitted. There is always the risk of reversal, but
that risk should not-cannot-drive the system. The Supreme Court was better
able to treat the question of physician-assisted suicide and the issue of the Brady
Act because it had decisive opinions to review. One could assume that these
issues are closed, and they certainly may be for the immediate future. History
reminds us, though, that serious controversial issues are revisited from time to
time. This comment is written by a circuit judge whose life would certainly
have been different had the Dred Scott33 decision not been revisited.
I make no prediction for the future of any of the Ninth Circuit reversals,
but one commentator was not so cautious. Writing while Glucksberg34 was
pending before the Supreme Court, Roger S. Magnusson 35 in the Pacific Rim
Law and Policy Journal, predicted:
Although an adverse Supreme Court opinion could potentially retard the
process of pro-euthanasia law reform, this would be a temporary delay only
which could not survive generational change. In the United States and beyond,
the development of a legal right to die with medical assistance, appears
inevitable.36
32 This argument, like most of the arguments for splitting the circuit, has never made
sense to me. Accepting, arguendo, the hypothesis that the Ninth Circuit is reversed often
because it is "too" liberal or "too" often wrong, a split will still leave at least one, and
perhaps two, circuits that are too liberal or too often wrong.
33 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (superseded by the adoption of the 13th
and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution after the Civil War).
34 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
35 Lecturer, University of Sydney School of Law; B.A., LL.B. (Ions) (A.N.U.)
(1988), Ph.D. (Melb.) (1994).
36 Roger S. Magnusson, The Sanctity of Life and the Right to Die: Social and
1997]
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What is important to remember is that opinions, unlike arithmetic solutions,
may vary. Our system under the Constitution is designed to put an end to
variations because the Supreme Court makes the final decision. The danger is
not that an appellate court gets reversed, but that a court might let possible
reversal deter decisive, full, and reasoned consideration of important issues. An
even greater danger is that the high regard in which all courts must be held if
our system is to be a rule of law, not of judges, is threatened if those who are
personally ambitious can dismiss a reasoned decision of any court with the
throwaway phrase-"oh well, that decision is just the irresponsible act of a
coterie of liberal judges." All tyrants first seek to malign the rule of law.
Jurisprudential Aspects of the Euthanasia Debate in Australia and the United States, 6 PAC.
RIM& PoL'YJ. 1, 5 (1997).
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